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[Crim. No. 4823. In Bank. Dec. 17, 1947.]

THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. ROBERT V. McRAE,
Respondent.
(1] Sodomr-Evidence-Accomplices.-A IS-year-old youth who
knows that the act of sex perversion denounced by Pen. Code,
§ 288a, is wrongful and who willingly par~icipates therein,
is an accomplice.

(2] Criminal Law - Preliminary Examination - Examination.While a committing oagistrate should receive the testimony
of an accomplice with caution and distrust, he may nevertheless believe the testimony of the accomplice and conclude
therefrom that there is probable cause to believe defendant
guilty of a public offense to which he should be held to answer.
[8] Id.-Prelimi!lary Proceedings-Holding to Answer-Sdicient
Cause.-A magistrate can hold a defendant to answer on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice since Pen. Code,
§ 1111, prohibits only a conviction based solely on such testimony and is in harmony with the principle that less evidence
is required to support a determination of probable cause for
a commitment than a determination of guilt for a ccnviction.

[1] See 8 Cal.Jur. 173; 2~ Cal.JUT. 400; 48 Am.JUT. 51;2.
J4cK. Dig. References: [1] Sodomy, § 11; [2] Criminal Law,
1164; [3,4J Criminal Law, § 175.
.
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[4] Id.-Preliminal'J' Proceedings-Bolding to Answer-Su1ficient
Cause.-In determining that there is probable cause to hold
a defendant, a magistrate is not bound by the rule that there
must be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of a defendant, and
he may commit a 'defendant, even though there may be doubt
as to' his guilt.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sacramento County setting aside an information. Raymond T.
Coughlin, JUdge. Reversed.
.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Ruth Bernfeld and
Clarence A. Linn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant.
Peter Mannino and C. K. Curtright for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Respondent was charged in an information with violating section 288a of the Penal Code. The
only evidence at the preliminary hearing was the testimony
of the complaining witness. The magistrate held respondent
to answer. The People appeal from an order of the superior court granting respondent's motion under section 995
of the Penal Code to set aside the information on the ground
that he was committed without reasonable or probable cause.
Respondent contends that the complaining witness was an
accomplice and that his testimony, which was uncorroborated,
could not support a determination by the magistrate under
section 872 of the Penal Code that there was sufficient cause
to believe respondent guilty of the offense charged. Respondent relies on section 1111 of the Penal Code, which provides: •• A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of
an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense . . . . " Appellant contends that the
complaining witness was not an accomplice and that even if
he was, his uncorroborated testimony could support the commitment, since section 1111 prohibits only a conviction based
SOlely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
[1] According to his testimony the complaining witness
submitted to the act committed upon him without resisting
or objecting to respondent's conduct. He was 15 years of
age, and there is nothing in his testimony to indicate that
(4] See 7 CaLJur. 982.
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he lacked normal mentality. Since his testimony shows that
he knew that the act was wrongful and that he willingly
participated therein, it follows that he was an accomplice.
(People v. Robbins, 171 Cal. 466, 472 [154 P. 317] ; People v. '
Tenner, 67 Cal.App.2d 360, 363 [154 P.2d 9] ; People v. Bey- .
nolds, 26 Cal.App.2d 219, 221 [79 P.2d 150] ; People v. Casey,
79 Cal.App. 295, 300 [249 P. 525] ; see People v. McCollum,
214 Cal. 601, 602 [7 P .2d 301].)
.
It was held in In ,.e Schwitalla, 36 Cal.App. 511 [172 P.
617]. that a magistrate can hold a defendant to answer upon
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. "While a
defendant cannot be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the testimony of an accomplice is
admissible, and is proper to be considered, and we think it
sufficient to make it appear that there is a 'probability' that
a defendant has been guilty of the offense charged against
him. " (36 Cal.App. 511, 512.) This case was followed by
thE' Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Curreri v. Vice, 77 F.2d 130. A Minnesota statute that also
required corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice to
support a conviction was similarly construed in State v. Jeffrey, 211 Minn. 55 [300 N.W. 7].
Respondent contends that the Schwitalla case was erroneous
and should be disapproved, on the ground that it construed
section 1111 according to its literal terms without regard
to its underlying policy that testimony of an accomplice
mllst be regarded with distrust. He contends that this policy
governs the testimony of an accomplice at a preliminary
ht'aring as well as at a trial and that a commitment, like a
conviction, cannot be based on the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice. Since the testimony of an accomplice
comes from an untrustworthy source and may be given in
expectation of immunity, it must be received by a jury with
caution and distrust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2061 (4); People ..
v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 653, 654 [140 P.2d 828], and cases :
there cited.) [2] A committing magistrate should likewise
receive the testimony of an accomplice with caution and distrust. A committing magistratt' may nevertheless believe the
testimony of an accomplice and conclude that there is probable
caust' 10 believe defendant guilty of a public offense to which
he should be held to answer.
[3] Section 1111 supplements the policy that testimony
of an accomplice shan be regarded with distrust by barring
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a conviction of a defendant based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, even though such testimony may convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
"The requirement of section 1111 of the Penal Code is in
addition to the requirement of the doctrine of reasonable
doubt; it in effect says that even though the jury are convinced to a moral certainty that the defendant is guilty,
yet they must acquit him if the testimony of the accomplice
is not corroborated by other evidence, which connects him or
tends to connect him with the offense charged." (People v.
Dillon, 68 Cal.App. 457, 477 [229 P. 974]; see People v.
Clough, 73 Cal. 348, 353 [15 P. 5] ; People v. Negra, 208 Cal.
64 [280 P. 354] ; 8 Cal.Jur. 173; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, 11th ed. 1225.) Thus, by prohibiting a conviction
based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, section 1111 precludes a result that might otherwise
follow from such testimony. It is explicit and complete
in defining the result that it precludes. In restricting its
prohibition to a conviction, section 1111 is in harmony with
the principle that less evidence is required to support a determination of probable cause for a commitment than a determination of guilt for a conviction. [4] It is settled that
in determining that there is probable cause to hold a defendant, a magistrate is not bound by the rule that there
must be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of a defendant,
and that he may commit a defendant, even though there may
be doubt as to his guilt. (People v. Nagle, 25 Ca1.2d 216, 222
[153 P.2d 344] ; People v. Tallman, 27 Ca1.2d 209, 212 [163
P.2d 857] ; People v. Mitchell, 27 Ca1.2d 678, 681 (166 P.2d
10].)
The order appealed from is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J OJ and Spence, J.,
concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. As held in the majority opinion,
the complaining witness is an accomplice; also, as stated in
the majority OpiniOll, the only evidence received at the preliminary hearing was the testimony of the accomplice. Such
testimony, uncorroborated, was wholly incompetent for the
proof of any fact (Pen. Code, § 1111; 22 C.J.S. 1418,
§ 813b; State v. Smith (1903), 138 Ala. 111 [35 So. 42, 100
Am.St.Rep. 26]); standing uncorroborated the status of the
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case as to proof of guilt, probable cause, or any other fact·
is exactly the same as though no evidence whatsoever had~;
been adduced.~:
The majority opinion errs, therefore, in applying the preliminary hearing rule as to quantum or persuasiveness of
proof to a situation where there is no proof. I have no
quarrel with the rule itself, which is that in a preliminary
examination proceeding it is not necessary that a defendant··
be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt j that it is suffi- .
cient to warrant binding him over for trial if upon the proof
it is reasonable to believe that the defendant is guilty of the
offense charged (People v. Mitchell (1946),27 Ca1.2d 678, 681
[166 P.2d 10], and cases there cited). Under this rule, even
though the committing magistrate may view the testimony of
an accomplice with caution, suspicion and doubt, he may
legally, if the accomplice's testimony is corroborated, hold
the defendant to answer. But if the testimony of the accomplice is left wholly uncorroborated and there is no other evidence of guilt then there is no competent evidence at all
upon which the order of commitment can be based.
The majority opinion cites and relies upon In,.8 Schwitalla
(1918), 36 Cal.App. 511, 512 [172 P. 617], wherein it is
said that "While a defendant cannot be convicted upon the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the testimony of
an accomplice is admissible, and is proper to be considered,
and we think is sufficient to make it appear that there is a
'probability' that a defendant has been guilty of the offense
charged against him." In my estimation, the quoted statement
is wholly erroneous and should be disapproved. Both the
Schwitalla opinion and the majority opinion here err in failing to recognize that in dealing with accomplices' testimonies
courts may be confronted with either of two materially different situations. One of those situations involves testimony which
is competent and admissible but the weight of which is impaired; the other situation relates to testimony as to the weight
of which there can be no question because it is wholly incompetent and cannot be considered at all.
Thus, as to the first type of situation, where a witness is
shown to be an accomplice but his testimony is corroborated,
his testimony is I}ompetent and admissible but the weight of
it is impaired by the fact that he is an accomplice. The
fact that he is an· accomplice in itself impeaches him as a
witness but when corroborated his testimony becomes com-
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petent and may be given whatever relative weight the trier
of fact determines. But as to the second class of situation,
where an admitted accomplice is permitted to testify and his
testimony is left wholly uncorroborated, there can be no question as to the weight to be accorded his testimony; it is entitled to no weight whatsoever; it should be stricken from
the record; it is wholly incompetent for the proof of any
fact in a criminal case. "Where the statutes forbid a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,·
it is held to be the duty of the court to direct an acquittal
where there is no corroboration within the requirements of
the statute, and even though corroboration is not required
by statute, it is held to be within the discretion of the trial
court to direct an acquittal where the evidence consists solely
of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." (22
C.J.S. 1418, § 813b.)
There is no satisfactory basis for holding that evidence
which, in the accumulated wisdom of the law, is wholly incompetent to prove any fact in the superior court, or to be
considered at all therein, shall be received and accepted as
the sole and complete proof of every essential fact in the
committing court. Again, I emphasize, we have here no
question as to quantum or degree of proof; we have a total
absence of any proof. The exact point now before us was
before the Supreme Court of Alabama in 8tate v. 8mith
(1903), supra, 138 Ala. 111 [35 So. 42, 100 Am.St.Rep. 26] ;
the statute of Alabama is substantially the same as ours. That
court said, "The above conclusion leaves but one question
in the case. That is whether the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice may be sufficient to show probable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed, and that the party
under inquiry is guilty thereof. . . . It is to be noted that
this statute in terms operates only to prevent convictions of
felony on the testimony of an accomplice. It does not in
terms apply to preliminary examinations, nor to trials on
habeas corpus, nor to the exclusion of a finding of probable
cause for believing that an offense has been committed, and
that the accused is guilty thereof, on such examination or
trial. Yet, in our opinion, its effect is to stamp a policy upon
the administration of the law in this connection which cannot
be carried out unless it be given operation upon cases where
the inquiry is probable cause vel non, as well as where the
inquiry is as to absolute guilt. The statute infects the
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testimony of accomplices with such absolute infirmity
that not only may the citizen be not convicted upon it, but"
as also that he should not be deprived of his liberty in"
anticipation of a final trial upon it. A consideration of:
practicabilities in the administration of the criminal law,;
so to speak, would seem to enforce the same conclusion. Why"
should the citizen be held to the trial jury, or indicted by
the grand jury, on testimony upon which no petit jury could
possibly convict him' What good end could be served bY'
such a proceeding' Can there be said to be even probable
cause shown in any case by testimony which the law expressly
and pooitively declares to be insufficient to support a conviction f We think not. . . • To hold him would be a vain'
and useless thing, involving his incarceration not as a pUnish~
ment for crime and not really to the end that he should be
tried for a crime charged of his probable guilt of which
there is evidence to prove, but at the best upon a mere speculation that evidence may be found to corroborate that of the
accomplice. The evidence before the probate judge in this
case tending to show the guilt of the petitioner was that of
the accomplice alone and uncorroborated. The judge correctly discharged the petitioner, and his order to that effect is
affirmed." (See, also, In,.e MitcheZZ (1905),1 Cal.App. 396,
401 [82 P. 374]; Ez parte OzZey (1915), 38 Nev; 379 [149
P. 992, 994].)
As in State v. Smith, .upra, the order of the trial court
should be affirmed.
Carter, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January
15, 1948. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.
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